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The Extraterritorial Application of U.s. Law: 
The Perversion of Democratic Governance, 
the Reversal of Institutional Roles, and the 
Imperative of Establishing Normative 
Principles 
Mark P. Gibney* 
I. EXTRATERRITORIALITY VERSUS DEMOCRATIC PRINCIPLES 
Given the ready acceptance of the principle that "Congress has the 
authority to enforce its laws beyond the territorial boundaries of the 
United States,"l the only real issue in cases involving the extraterritorial 
application of U.S. law is not whether Congress has the power to 
extend the force of domestic law beyond the nation's borders,2 or what 
the consequences would be if U.S. law was or was not applied ex-
traterritorially in a particular instance, but simply whether Congress 
had purportedly intended such a result when enacting certain legis-
lation. This reading of both international and domestic law stands 
in stark contrast to the prevailing theory at the turn of this century. 
At that time, U.S. law was based almost exclusively on the territo-
rial principle-the idea that the power of American law ends at the 
country's boundaries.3 Changes in the world economic system, how-
* Professor of Political Science, Purdue University. Ph.D., University of Michigan, Political 
Science, 1985; J.D., Villanova University School of Law, 1977; B.A., Boston College, Political 
Science, 1974. Fullbright Fellowship, Institute for Human Rights, Oslo University School of Law, 
Oslo, Norway, 1989. 
1 EEOC v. Arabian American Oil Co. (Aramco), 499 U.S. 244, 248 (1991). 
2 A few scholars have questioned this proposition that Congress has unbridled power to apply 
U.S. law wherever and whenever it chooses to do so. See Lea Brilmayer & Charles Norchi, Federal 
Extraterritoriality and Fifth Amendment Due Process, 105 HARv. L. REv. 1217 (1992) (arguing that 
the Fifth Amendment limits federal extraterritoriality in the same manner as the Fourteenth 
Amendment limits state extraterritoriality); Andreas F. Lowenfeld, U.S. Law Enforcement Abroad: 
The Constitution and International Law, 83 AM.J. INT'L L. 880 (1989) (arguing that extraterritorial 
criminal statutes that go beyond the provisions of international law violate the Due Process 
provisions of the Constitution). 
3 Although U.S. law had long been based on the territoriality principle, the first case to explicitly 
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ever, soon brought about a selectively different reading of the scope of 
U.S. law. 
Recognizing that activities which occurred wholly outside the coun-
try's borders could at times have a substantial domestic impact, the 
judiciary, perhaps doing the bidding of the political branches, began 
to give an extraterritorial reading to certain acts of Congress. Thus, 
antitrust laws that were originally limited to monopolistic practices 
within the United States began to be applied extraterritorially (without 
any change in the wording of the statute) when the domestic impact 
of these overseas activities became more recognizable.4 Likewise, and 
enunciate this was American Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co., 213 U.S. 347 (1909). An American 
businessman named McConnell had purchased a banana plantation in Panama, which at the 
time was still a part of Columbia. [d. at 354. McConnell was promptly contacted by the United 
Fruit Company, a U.S. corporation aggressively seeking to monopolize the Central American 
banana trade. [d. United Fruit provided McConnell with one of two unenviable choices: either 
sell the plantation to them, or get out of the business. McConnell refused both offers, but later 
sold his plantation to the American Banana Company, a newly established enterprise run out of 
Alabama. [d. 
Subsequent to this, Costa Rica invaded the now-independent Panama, allegedly at the behest 
of United Fruit. Costa Rican forces seized American Banana's plantation and gave it to a person 
named Atsua, who immediately sold it to United Fruit. [d. at 355. Having lost its plantation, 
American Banana shifted venues from the battlefield to the courtroom and brought an antitrust 
action against United Fruit. In its suit, American Banana charged United Fruit with a number of 
anti-competitive acts: conspiring with other banana producers, interfering with American Ba-
nana's contracts, and below-cost bidding. American Banana, 213 U.S. at 355. 
The case eventually made its way to the United States Supreme Court which held that the 
Sherman Act did not apply to monopolistic practices that occur beyond the country's borders. 
[d. at 356. In fact, in his majority opinion, Justice Holmes expressed no small measure of surprise 
that such a case was brought in the first place. 
It is obvious that, however stated, that plaintiffs case depends on several rather startling 
propositions. In the first place, the acts causing the damage were done, so far as it 
appears, outside the jurisdiction of the United States and within that of other states. It 
is surprising to hear it argued that they were governed by the act of Congress. 
[d. at 355. 
Holmes then went on to enunciate a rule of law that would soon come to be modified: "the 
general and almost universal rule is that the character of an act as lawful or unlawful must be 
determined wholly by the law of the country where the act is done." [d. at 356. 
4 Consider the changes in the scope of antitrust laws. Notwithstanding the rather absolute 
language in American Banana, 213 U.S. at 347, a short time after that decision the Court began 
to erode the territoriality principle in cases which applied U.S. law to companies engaged in the 
transportation of goods to and from the United States. Thus, in United States v. Pacific & Artic 
Ry. & Navigation, 228 U.S. 87 (1913), the Supreme Court applied American antitrust laws against 
a Canadian company's conspiracy to monopolize rail transportation between the United States 
and Canada, reasoning that failure to do so would "put the transportation route ... out of the 
control of either Canada or the United States." [d. at 106. In United States v. Sisal Sales Corp., 
274 U.S. 268 (1927), the Court further expanded the scope of U.S. antitrust law. In that case, the 
government brought antitrust charges against American companies for a conspiracy to monop-
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for much the same reason, the judiciary soon gave a very broad juris-
dictional reading to trademark5 and securities6 laws as well. In rather 
olize Mexican sisal exports. Although the monopoly was to operate in Mexico. the Supreme Court 
held that the conspiracy was furthered by agreements that had been made within the United 
States, and that an export monopoly would have direct effects within this country. [d. at 275. 
The transformation was completed in United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416 
(2d Cir. 1945). The Second Circuit, sitting as a court oflast resort by virtue of the Supreme Court's 
inability to muster a quorum, held that the Sherman Act applied extraterritorially to a Canadian 
corporation's participation, outside the United States, in an international aluminum cartel. [d. 
at 443. Employing what eventually became known as the "effects test," the court, in an opinion 
written by Judge Learned Hand, permitted the extraterritorial application of U.S. antitrust laws 
to conduct that had sufficient contact with the United States, even if none of the events compris-
ing the monopoly occurred in the United States. [d. at 443-44. 
Commenting on this extraterritorial transformation ofU .S. antitrust law, Gary Born has written: 
The significant extension of the extraterritorial reach of the antitrust laws under Alcoa's 
effects test did not result from amendments to the Sherman Act or from any newly-dis-
covered reading of the Act and its legislative history. The differences instead resulted 
indirectly from new economic realities and regulatory demands, and more directly from 
the perceived changes in principles of public international law, conflict oflaws thinking 
and state practice that followed this evolution. 
Gary Born, A Reappraisal of the Extraterritorial Reach of u.s. Law, 24 LAw & POL'y INT'L Bus. 1, 
31 (1992). 
5 The Lanham Act is also known as the Trademark Act of 1946. Act of July 5, 1946, ch. 540, 60 
Stat. 427 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.c. §§ 1051-127 (1988». The Lanham Act provides, in 
relevant part: 
Any person who shall, in commerce, (a) use, without the consent of the registrant, any 
reproduction, counterfeit, copy or colorable imitation of any registered mark in con-
nection with the sale, offering for sale, or advertising of any goods or services ... or ... 
(b) reproduce, counterfeit, copy, or colorably imitate any such mark ... shall be liable 
to a civil action by the registrant for any or all of the remedies hereinafter provided in 
this chapter. 
15 U.S.C. § 1114(1). "Commerce" is defined in the Act as "all commerce which may lawfully be 
regulated by Congress," 15 U.S.C. § 1127. 
In Steele v. Bulova Watch Co., 344 U.S. 280 (1952), the Supreme Court read the Lanham Act 
as having extraterritorial application. The defendant was a U.S. citizen who operated a factory 
in Mexico that made counterfeit Bulova watches. [d. Mter examining a number of factors-the 
purposes behind the Lanham Act, the negative effects from such conduct in the United States, 
the defendant's nationality, and the absence of any conflict of law between the United States and 
Mexico-the Court held that the Lanham Act could reach these activities in Mexico. [d. at 285. 
6 The Securities Exchange Act, Pub. L. No. 73-291, ch. 404 (1934) (codified as amended at 15 
U .S.C. §§ 78a-ll (1988». The Act is only applicable where the "means of the mails or instrumen-
tality of interstate commerce" has been employed. 15 U.S.c. § 78b(1) (a). The Act defines "inter-
state commerce" as any "trade, commerce, transportation, or communication ... between any 
foreign country and any State." 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a) (17). The Act, however, exempts from its 
coverage "any person insofar as he transacts a business in securities without the jurisdiction of 
the United States." 15 U.S.C. § 78dd(b). 
Despite this confusing jurisdictional language, a number of federal courts have given the 
Securities Exchange Act an extraterritorial reading, although a few courts have admitted to their 
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stark contrast to this, certain areas of the law, most notably labor 
regulations7 and environmentallegislation,8 were, and continue to be, 
given strict territorial readings. 
ignorance of where this power explicitly comes from. See Bersch v. Drexel Firestone, Inc., 519 
F.2d 974, 993 (2d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1018 (1975) ('We freely acknowledge that if 
we were asked to point to language in the statutes, or even in the legislative history, that compelled 
these conclusions [extraterritoriality], we would be unable to respond."); Continental Grain Pry. 
v. Pacific Oilseeds, Inc., 592 F.2d 409,421 (8th Cir. 1979) ('We frankly admit that the finding of 
subject matter jurisdiction in the present case is largely a policy decision."). 
7 In a series of decisions the judiciary, quite often the Supreme Court itself, has refused to apply 
extraterritorially to: the Eight Hour Law, 40 U.S.C. §§ 324-25 (1940); see Foley Bros., Inc. v. 
Filardo, 336 U.S. 281 (1949) (holding that the Eight Hour Law did not apply to contract between 
the United States and a private contractor for construction work in a foreign country); the Labor 
Management Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 141 (1982); McCullough v. Sociedad Nacional de Marin-
eros de Honduras, 372 U.S. 10 (1963) (holding that the Labor Management Relations Act was 
not applicable to the internal management and affairs of vessels flying the Honduran flag); Benz 
v. Compania Naviera Hidalgo, S.A., 353 U.S. 138 (1957) (holding that the Labor Management 
Relations Act did not apply to a labor dispute involving American workers on a foreign ship even 
while the ship was temporarily in an American port); the Federal Employer's Liability Act, 45 
U.S.C. § 51 (1982); New York Cent. R.R. v. Chisholm, 268 U.S. 29 (1925) (holding that the Federal 
Employer's Liability Act had no extraterritorial effect and does not subject an interstate carrier 
to liability for death of an employee killed outside U.S. territory); the Railway Labor Act, 45 U .S.C. 
§ 151 (1982); Air Line Dispatchers Ass'n v. National Mediation Bd., 189 F.2d 685 (D.C. Cir. 1951) 
cert. denied, 342 U.S. 849 (1951) (holding that the Railway Labor Act could not be applied 
extraterritorially to dispute between U.S. air carriers and employees in foreign countries); Air 
Line Stewardesses Ass'n, Int'l v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 273 F.2d 69 (2d Cir. 1959), cert. denied 
361 U.S. 901 (1959) (holding that the Railway Labor Act could not be applied to force U.S. airline 
to bargain with certified representative of flight attendants who were not U.S. nationals or 
residents and who were employed by the airline solely in connection with flights outside the 
continental United States); the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1982) (the 
National Labor Relations Act was amended by the Labor Management Relations Act); the Equal 
Pay Act, 29 U.S.C. § 206 (1982); Foley Bros., 336 U.S. at 286 (noting that Equal Pay Act cannot 
be applied extraterritorially). 
8 See generally Beatrice A. Cameron, Global Aspiration, Local Adjudication: A Context for the 
Extraterritorial Application of Environmental Law, 11 WIS. INT'L LJ. 381, 417 (1993) ("U.S. courts 
have, over the years, been anything but hospitable to arguments that U.S. environmental laws 
should apply extraterritorially."). 
One of the most noteworthy examples of this antipathy toward the extraterritorial application 
of U.S. law to enforce environmental, health and safety regulations concerned the sale of a 
nuclear power reactor to the Philippines by the Westinghouse Corporation in the mid-1970s. The 
plant was to be situated above an earthquake fault line, and just below an active volcano. In terms 
of technical design, the nuclear power plant did not meet domestic (U.S.) standards. Despite this 
uncontroverted evidence, the Nuclear Power Commission voted to issue the plant's license, taking 
the position that it lacked jurisdiction, under domestic statutes, to consider the health, safety and 
environmental impacts on the citizens of a recipient nation, or even to consider the effects of an 
exported reactor on U.S. interests and U.S. citizens abroad (U.S. military bases were within the 
immediate region). In re Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 11 N.R.C. 631 (1980). The District of 
Columbia Circuit affirmed this decision, holding that the agency had properly approved the 
exported reactor without evaluating the health, safety and environmental impacts. Natural Re-
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The law at the present time, at least as it is stated, is that there is a 
presumption against the extraterritorial application of U.S. law. As the 
Supreme Court recently held in EEOC v. Arabian American Oil Co. 
(A ra m co) , it is a "long-standing principle of American law that legisla-
tion of Congress, unless a contrary intent appears, is meant to apply 
only within the territorial jurisdiction of the United States."9 Unfor-
tunately, with very rare exception, Congress gives little guidance to 
whether U.S. law should apply beyond our country's territorial 
boundaries. In fact, there are only a handful of statutes where Congress 
has explicitly spelled out the extraterritorial application,IO or non-ap-
plication ,11 of the law. Instead, in the vast majority of legislative and 
executive enactments there is very hazy and ambiguous jurisdictional 
language, and the task of interpreting extraterritoriality from this has 
fallen on the courts. The problem, however, is that the judiciary has 
been no more consistent, on the surface at least, than Congress. In 
some instances the courts have read very ambiguous statutory language 
quite expansively, but in other cases they have taken equally broad 
language and given it a territorial interpretation.12 
sources Defense Council v. Nuclear Power Regulatory Comm'n (NRC), 647 F.2d 1345 (D.C. Cir. 
1981). 
For an excellent description of the process and a scathing critique of the territorial rulings, see 
Anthony D'Amato & Kirsten Engel, State Responsimlity for the Exportation of Nuclear Power Tech-
nology, 74 VA. L. REv. 1011 (1988). 
9499 U.S. 244, 248 (1991) (quoting Foley Bros., Inc. v. Filardo, 336 U.S. 281, 285 (1949)). 
10 Congressional intent is clearest in statutes that explicitly address extraterritoriality. Section 
175 of the Biological Weapons Anti-Terrorism Act, for example, contains specific extraterritorial 
language. Pub. L. No. 101-298, 104 Stat. 201, codified at 18 U.S.C. § 175 ("[t]here is extraterri-
torial federal jurisdiction over an offense under this section committed by or against a national 
of the United States."). Similarly, the Maritime Drug Law Enforcement Act, explicitly spells out 
its extraterritorial scope. 46 U.S.C. app. § 1903 (1988). Section (h) of the Act is entitled "Exten-
sion beyond the territorial jurisdiction of the United States," and it reads: "This section is intended 
to reach acts of possession, manufacture, or distribution committed outside the territorial juris-
diction of the United States." 46 U.S.C. app. § 1903(h) (1988). 
11 One of the clearest examples where Congress has given a unequivocal territorial limitation 
to a statute is the Fair Labor Standards Act, which specifically excludes certain sections of itself 
from applying to employees in a workplace, "within a foreign country." 29 U.S.C. § 213 (1988). 
These sections refer to maximum hours, minimum wages, child labor, and essential labor prac-
tices. [d. 
12 For example, the language in the Lanham Act referring to "any person," supra note 5, has 
been interpreted as indicating an extraterritorial intent. Steele v. Bulova Watch, 344 U.S. 280 
(1952). Similarly, notwithstanding the confusing and seemingly contradictory language in the 
Securities Exchange Act, supra note 6, the courts have applied U.S. securities laws outside the 
country's borders. Continental Grain Pry. v. Pacific Oilseeds, Inc., 592 F.2d 409 (8th Cir. 1979); 
Bersch v. Drexel Firestone, Inc., 519 F.2d 974 (2d Cir. 1975). 
Contrast these results with the Supreme Court's decision in Foley Bros., Inc. v. Filardo, 336 
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It is not likely that the Supreme Court's recent forays into this area 
will clear up the apparent confusion, and the patently inconsistent 
applications of the extraterritorial presumption will most likely re-
main.13 One reason is that, notwithstanding the Court's "clear state-
U.S. 281 (1949). In that case a U.S. citizen working on U.S. government public works projects in 
Iran and Iraq brought suit. The issue before the Court was whether the Eight Hour Law applied 
to workers outside the country's borders. The Law provides that 
Every contract made to which the United States ... is a party shall contain a provision 
that no laborer or mechanic doing any part of the work contemplated by the contract, 
in the employ of the contractor or any subcontractor ... shall be required or permitted 
to work more than eight hours in anyone calendar day upon such work .... 
40 U.S.C. § 324 (1940). The Supreme Court gave a restrictive reading to the Eight Hour Law, 
holding that the law did not distinguish between U.S. citizens and foreign nationals. Foley Bros., 
336 U.S. at 284. 
Perhaps the environmental caselaw presents the most puzzling and troublesome results. Much 
of it has revolved around the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (NEPAl, 42 U.S.C. 
§§ 4321-79 (1982). NEPA mandates that federal agencies must issue environmental impact 
statements (EIS) for projects undertaken by the federal government. Although the statute is 
replete with extraterritorial language "recognizing the ... critical importance of restoring and 
maintaining environmental quality to the overall welfare and development of man," the statute 
has generally been given a territorial application. Amlon Metals Inc. v. FMC Corp., 775 F.Supp. 
668 (S.D.N.Y 1991); Greenpeace v. Stone, 748 F.Supp. 749 (D. Haw. 1990); Natural Resources 
Defense Council v. N.R.C., 647 F.2d 1345 (D.C. Cir. 1981); But see, Environmental Defense Fund 
v. Massey, 986 F.2d 528 (D.C. Cir. 1993). See generally Cameron, supra note 8. 
13 In fact, the Supreme Court's decision in Aramco only serves to underscore many of the 
problems that exist in this area because this appeared to be one of the few instances where 
Congress had clearly indicated an extraterritorial intent. 
The question before the Court in Aramco was whether Congress intended the Civil Rights Act 
of 1964 to be applied extraterritorially. Aramco, 499 U.S. at 248. The plaintiff, Ali Boureslan, was 
a naturalized U.S. citizen who worked in Saudi Arabia. Id. at 246. The defendant corporations 
were Arabian American Oil Company and Aramco Services Corporation, both Delaware corpo-
rations, whose principal places of business were Saudi Arabia and Texas respectively. Id. Boureslan 
claimed that he was fired from his position because of discrimination based on race, national 
origin and religion. Id. The plaintiff based his arguments on three separate grounds, none of 
which were successful. First, that Title VII prohibits discriminatory acts by employers engaged in 
"commerce," defined to include any activity involving "trade, traffic, commerce, transportation, 
or communication among the several States, or between a State and any place outside thereof." 
Because the definition of "State" already included territories and the District of Columbia, the 
plaintiff argued that "any place outside thereof' must refer to foreign commerce. Id. at 246. 
Aramco countered that this language simply created a jurisdictional nexus under the commerce 
clause and that it had nothing to do with the scope of liability. Aramco, 499 U.S. at 247. The Court 
found it unnecessary to choose between these two interpretations. 
Each is plausible, but no more persuasive than that. The language relied upon by 
petitioners-and it is they who must make the affirmative showing-is ambiguous, and 
does not speak directly to the question presented here. The intent of Congress as to the 
extraterritorial application of the statute must be deduced by inference from boilerplate 
language which can be found in any number of congressional acts, none which have 
ever been held to apply overseas. 
Id. at 250-51. 
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ment" rule in Aramco,14 both the judiciary and the Congress are simply 
too wedded to precedent to envision any dramatic change. To state the 
proposition baldly, the Sherman Antitrust law will not-cannot-be 
interpreted as it originally had been in American Banana. 15 The same 
is true of securities regulations and trademark law; and any hesitancy 
in applying and enforcing American criminal law overseas apparently 
ended some time ago. 16 
Petitioner's second argument was based on Title VII's so-called "alien exemption" which 
provides that the statute "shall not apply to an employer with respect to the employment of aliens 
outside any State." Id. at 252. Reasoning that there would have been no need to exempt aliens 
abroad unless the statute had extraterritorial application, the petitioners argued that the logical 
inference is that Title VII was meant to protect Americans employed "outside any state." Id. The 
Court did not accept this view, claiming that there would be no way of distinguishing between 
U.S. corporations doing business overseas from foreign corporations who employed U.S. citizens 
in their home operations. Id. at 253. 
Thus, a French employer of a United States citizen in France would be subject to Title 
VII-a result at which even petitioners balk. The EEOC assures us that in its term 
"employer" means only "American employer," but there is no such distinction in the 
statute, and no indication that EEOC in the normal course of its administration had 
produced a reasoned basis for such a distinction. 
Aramco, 499 U.S. at 255. 
Finally, the petitioners argued that the Court should defer to the EEOC guidelines which for 
some time had interpreted Title VII to protect Americans employed abroad. The Court re-
sponded that under the particular circumstances of the case, where the EEOC had originally 
interpreted the act not to apply extraterritorially, much less deference would be given to the 
agency's guidelines. Id. at 256-57. 
14 It is possible to interpret the Court's holding as requiring a clear statement from the judiciary 
from Chief Justice Rehnquist's language: "Therefore, unless there is 'the affirmative intention of 
the Congress clearly expressed.'" 499 U.S. at 248 (quoting Benz v. Compania Naviera Hidalgo, 
SA, 353 U.S. 138, 147 (1957». 
15 American Banana v. United Fruit Co., 213 U.S. 347 (1909). In his opinion in Hartford Fire 
Ins. Co. v. California, 113 S. Ct. 2891 (1993), Justice Scalia touched upon the lack of apparent 
extraterritorial intent in the Sherman Act. Commenting on the Aramco decision, where the Court 
had found insufficient extraterritorial congressional intent in the "boilerplate" language of the 
statute, Justice Scalia offered the following, rather unpersuasive, distinction between the two 
situations. 
The Sherman Act contains similar "boilerplate language," and if the question were not 
governed by precedent, it would be worth considering whether that presumption con-
trols the outcome here. We have, however, found the presumption to be overcome with 
respect to our antitrust laws; it is now well established that the Sherman Act applies 
extraterritorially. 
Id. at 2918. 
16Justice Brennan, in his dissenting opinion in United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 
259 (1990), spells out the tremendous changes in the scope of American law, particularly the 
criminal component. 
Particularly in the past decade, our Government has sought, successfully, to hold foreign 
nationals criminally liable under federal laws for conduct committed entirely beyond 
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A second, and more important, reason why the extraterritorial appli-
cation of U.S. law will continue to be applied inconsistently is that this 
seeming inconsistency serves some very useful political ends. Jonathan 
Turley has suggested that the extraterritorial caselaw can best be ex-
plained on the basis of economic principlesP In his view, the courts 
have applied one set of standards in "market" cases (Le. antitrust and 
securities matters) that have readily allowed the extraterritorial appli-
cation of U.S. law, while courts have applied what essentially amounts 
to an irrebuttable presumption against extraterritoriality in so-called 
"nonmarket" cases. IS The problem, however, is that the division be-
tween "market" and "nonmarket" cases is not always clear. For example, 
how would one categorize the sale of a nuclear power reactor to the 
Philippines?19 On one level this would be a "market" case pure and 
simple, and one could expect the extraterritorial application of U.S. 
law. On quite a different level, however, the sale could be (and has 
been) seen as an environmental case (Le., "nonmarket") where domes-
tic (U.S.) safety and environmental standards are viewed by both regu-
latory agencies and the courts as irrelevant.2o 
This article offers a slightly different interpretation of the caselaw. 
Rather than promoting some general principle such as the free market, 
as Turley suggests, a simpler, but more accurate, description is that U.S. 
law has been applied extraterritorially when that has served the na-
tional interest of the United States or its corporate actors, and it has 
been given a territorial application when a restrictive interpretation 
would serve those same ends.21 Thus, monopolistic practices that occur 
the territorial limits of the United States that nevertheless has effects in this country. 
Foreign nationals must now take care not to violate our drug laws, our antitrust laws, 
our securities laws, and a host of other federal criminal sanctions. The enormous 
expansion of federal criminal jurisdiction outside our Nation's boundaries has led one 
commentator to suggest that our country's three largest exports are now "rock music, 
blue jeans, and United States law.» 
ld. at 279-80 (quoting V. Rock Grundman, The New Imperialism: The Extraterritorial Application 
of United States Law, 14 INT'L LAw. 257, 257 (1980» (citations omitted). 
17 Jonathan Turley, "When in Rome": Multinational Misconduct and the Presumption Against 
Extraterritoriality, 84 Nw. U. L. REv. 598 (1990). 
181d. at 623. 
19 See supra note 8 and accompanying text. 
20 See id. 
21 In fact, sometimes both phenomena appear in the same case, although there is no assurance 
of a consistent answer. For example, in criticizing the Supreme Court's holding in Haitian Centers 
Council v. Sale, 113 S. Ct. 2549 (1993) (upholding the legality of the government's interdiction 
program on the grounds that the Immigration and Nationality Act did not apply extraterritori-
ally), Harold Koh has commented: "if Congress had intended the statute to operate extraterrito-
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in any part of the world that might have a negative effect on the 
American economy can be reached by U.S. law. The same is true for 
criminal behavior that occurs outside the country's borders, but which 
might have some negative consequences within the United States. In 
sharp contrast, applying domestic safety standards to nuclear reactors 
sold by U.S. corporations to Third World countries is essentially treated 
as an interference with the ability of U.S. corporations to effectively 
compete in a global market.22 Much the same is true of labor regula-
tions as well.23 The only thing that makes these cases somewhat more 
difficult is the effect that denying extraterritoriality might have on 
American citizens, who would thereby be denied the protection of U.S. 
law. 24 
The most remarkable aspect of extraterritoriality-oftentimes lost in 
the futile effort to uncover Congressional intent-is that it represents 
such a vastly different conception of the law than what exists under the 
norms and principles of democratic rule. In this country, for example, 
the creation and application of the law has as its very basis the notion 
of the consent of the governed. That is, those who create and pass the 
laws are ultimately held accountable to "the people." This, however, is 
not the situation in the extraterritorial context. Extraterritoriality is 
essentially a situation where rule makers in one country get to pick and 
choose which of their own rules they will apply in other countries. 
Under this scheme, the lawmakers in the country promulgating laws 
rially to authorize interdiction of the Haitians, why should a court presume that Congress did not 
intend the statute's protections to operate extraterritorially as well?" Harold H. Koh, The Haitian 
Refugee Litigation: A Case Study in Transnational Public Law Litigation, 18 MD. J. INT'L L. & TRADE 
1,15 (1994). 
22 This is the interpretation provided by D'Amato & Engel of why industrialized countries often 
refuse to apply their own domestic standards when their economic units attempt to sell nuclear 
power reactors in the developing world. D'Amato & Engel, supra note 8, at 1017. 
23 Born, supra note 4, at 31. 
24 For example, Jonathan Turley has argued that in the NRC case, discussed supra note 8, 
American law should have been applied extraterritorially because of the negative "effects" that 
might be felt by the 40,000 or so U.S. service personnel who were stationed within a 50 mile 
radius of the nuclear reactor. Turley, supra note 17, at 639. There are two problems with this 
argument. The first is deciding what number of U.S. citizens living or working outside American 
borders would have to be endangered or otherwise affected in order to invoke the extraterritorial 
application and protection of U.S. law. Beyond that, accepting Turley's premise would mean 
accepting the proposition that the U.S. government only has a duty to offer protection to its own 
citizens. This is a very narrow view of what constitutes moral behavior. See generally MARK GIBNEY, 
STRANGERS OR FRIENDS: PRINCIPLES FOR A NEW ALIEN ADMISSION POLICY (1986); HENRY SHUE, 
BASIC RIGHTS: SUBSISTENCE, AFFLUENCE, AND U.S. FOREIGN POLICY (1980); Exporting Hazards, 
91 ETHICS 579 (1981); Peter Singer, Famine, Affluence, and Morality, 1 PHIL. & PUB. AFr. 229 
(1972); CHARLES BEITZ, POLITICAL THEORY AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS (1979). 
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that will be enforced in other countries are not accountable to "the 
people" in these other lands. These "other people," are not consulted 
about the application of foreign law to them, nor do they have the 
ready means to change the law if it is not consistent with their own 
domestic standards and norms. 
Notwithstanding the absence of this rudimentary aspect of repre-
sentative rule, "democracies" (democratic, that is, in their own domes-
tic sphere) have applied their laws in other countries in increasing 
measures25-and they have done so notwithstanding the existence of 
conflicts that thereby have arisen, and oftentimes in the face of the 
expressed contrary desires of other countries.26 They have done so even 
though extraterritoriality is seldom reciproca127 (that is, country A is 
able to apply its laws in country B, but country B does not have the 
political or economic power to apply its laws in country A) .28 Finally, I 
25 See generally Ethan A. Nadelmann, The Rnle of the United States in the International Enfareement 
of Criminal Law, 31 HARV. INT'L LJ. 37 (1990). 
26Id. The conflicts are both substantive and procedural in nature. An example of a substantive 
conflict is the different treatment of insider trading. In the United States, insider trading consti-
tutes a violation of the Securities Exchange Act, while in most other countries this is not a criminal 
act. A procedural difference, with substantive content, would be the manner of obtaining criminal 
evidence. United States agents commonly recruit informants and employ plea bargaining tech-
niques to elicit testimony. Such actions are impermissible in most civil law countries. Id. at 49. 
27To give some indication of the potential reach of U.S. law, consider Andreas Lowenfeld's 
example of the jurisdictional scope of the Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984, Pub. L. 
No. 98-473, ch. 19, § 2002(a), 98 Stat. 1976,2186 (1984). 
Congress was adopting the passive personality principle without any link to an interna-
tional convention, making that principle applicable to murder, manslaughter, robbery 
and other crimes of violence solely on the basis that either the accused or the victim 
was a United States national. If two persons aboard a Greek or Panamanian flag ship 
on the high seas had a fight and one of the two was an American citizen, the United 
States could prosecute either of them for assault, regardless of whether the American 
was the assailant or the victim. 
Lowenfeld, supra note 2, at 888. 
28 Ethan Nadelmann has offered the following analysis of the jurisdictional conflicts and 
inequities that have arisen from the extraterritorial application and enforcement of U.S. law: 
Jurisdictional conflicts, however, do not lead to international conflicts unless the gov-
ernment asserting its extraterritorial basis of jurisdiction can support that claim with an 
enforcement action. For instance, conflict will not result if a relatively powerless state 
asserts extraordinarily broad jurisdictional claims. It cannot effectively give substance to 
such claims. But when the United States expands the reach of its criminal jurisdiction, 
the potential for conflict is rife. The ability of the United States government to demand 
foreign recognition of its claims to extraterritorial jurisdiction greatly exceeds that of 
any other government. Its unparalleled networks of law enforcement, diplomatic, and 
intelligence agents provide numerous means to further United States interests globally. 
At the same time, most foreign governments and multinational corporations have 
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would suggest that they have done so without any semblance of a 
system of checks and balances, a proposition that is an anathema to 
our political system.29 The reason for this is that the judicial branch 
has devoted itself far more to the promulgation of U.S. law overseas 
than it has served to protect the well-being and interests of those who 
are bound by the strictures of U.S. law, but who lack the protections 
of U.S. law or the Constitution. 
There is very little likelihood that the United States can-or neces-
sarily should-reverse the expansive trend toward the extraterritorial 
application and enforcement of U.S. law. There are simply too many 
phenomena in other countries that are seen as infringing upon U.S. 
interests. This will not change, and if anything, the desire to apply U.S. 
law in other countries will only continue to grow. If, however, the 
United States is to apply its laws in other countries in a manner that is 
both morally legitimate as well as true to its democratic principles, two 
changes must occur. First, the United States must reverse the roles 
played by its government institutions. To date, the judicial branch has 
taken the lead in applying U.S. law extraterritorially. When doing so, 
the rationale that is always given is that the courts are merely carry-
ing out Congressional intent. That rationale, however, has not fooled 
many, includingjudges themselves.30The mandate in Aramajll is a clear 
one-that it is Congress' responsibility to determine extraterritorial-
ity-but it is by no means clear whether Congress will meet these 
standards, or if the courts can exhibit the requisite restraint. The track 
record to date does not inspire much confidence. Beyond this, it is 
important to note that the objection is not simply that the judiciary 
has essentially taken on a legislative function; it is the fact that there 
has been no institutional check on the extraterritorial application of 
U.S. law. 
sufficient interests in, and contacts with, the United States to be susceptible to a wide 
variety of United States pressures, ranging from domestic law enforcement actions to 
economic sanctions. Most foreign governments thus have good reason to fear the United 
States government's assertions of extraterritorial jurisdiction over violations of its anti-
trust, export control, money laundering, tax, and even drug and terrorism statutes. 
Today, many of the more serious conflicts between the United States and its allies over 
criminal justice issues focus on precisely these extraterritorial assertions. 
Nadelmann, supra note 25, at 42. 
29 Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 293 (1926) (Brandeis, j., dissenting) ("The doctrine of 
the separation of powers was adopted by the convention of 1787 not to promote efficiency but 
to preclude the exercise of arbitrary power."). 
30 See supra note 6 and accompanying text. 
31 EEOC v. Arabian American Oil Co. (Aramco), 499 U.S. 244, 248 (1991). 
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The second change that needs to be made is that extraterritoriality 
needs to be viewed in the cold light of reality. This means that the 
United States must recognize that extraterritoriality is, by definition, 
anti-democratic in nature; that it is nearly always non-reciprocal and 
more often than not reflective of the relative political power of coun-
tries; that protection of the law has generally not followed the extra-
territorial enforcement of the law; and finally, that the extraterritorial 
application of U.S. law in particular has given the United States a 
license to employ one set of standards, legal or otherwise, for itself, 
but quite another for those who live in other countries, but who are 
under the constraints of U.S. law. 
II. REALIGNING INSTITUTIONAL ROLES 
In the domestic sphere, Congress and the Executive branch are 
responsible for the creation of the law, while the judiciary serves as 
a check on the political branches, ensuring that the laws that U.S. 
citizens live under meet constitutional standards. This is the intent-
and the genius-of the tripartite form of government in the United 
States.32 However, something entirely different occurs when the 
United States enters the international realm, or anything that even 
hints of foreign affairs.33 There, the judiciary, with only a few excep-
32 In his seminal work, John Hart Ely argues that our constitutional scheme is premised on the 
idea that all voices are heard and somehow represented in the political debate. 
The Constitution has ... proceeded from the quite sensible assumption that an effective 
majority will not inordinately threaten its own rights, and has sought to assure that such 
a majority not systematically treat others less well than it treats itself-by structuring 
decision processes at all levels to try to ensure, first, that everyone's interest will be 
actually or virtually represented (usually both) at the point of substantive decision, and 
second, that the processes of individual application will not be manipulated so as to 
reintroduce in practice the sort of discrimination that is impermissible in theory. 
JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 100-01 (1980). 
33 Harold Koh has written the definitive study in THE NATIONAL SECURITY CONSTITUTION: 
SHARING POWER AFTER THE IRAN-CONTRA AFFAIR (1990). Koh claims that one of the major 
failings of the Articles of Confederation was the inability to maintain a system of checks and 
balances in the international realm, and that one of the primary purposes of the new Constitution 
was to carry forward to the field of foreign affairs the same checks and balances system that had 
been established for domestic matters. Koh writes: 
To remedy the Articles' defects, the Founding Fathers framed the constitutional provi-
sions on foreign affairs with two goals in mind-to fashion a stronger national govern-
ment while holding each branch of that government accountable to the others through 
a strong system of checks and balances. The two goals were closely related. On the one 
hand, the Framers overwhelmingly agreed upon the need for increased national power 
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tions,34 has essentially played a supine role, which in turn has given the 
political branches an enormous amount of leeway.35 
In the extraterritorial context the United States has yet a third model 
of governance. A strong case could be made that it has been the 
judiciary which has created much of the law (or at least its extraterri-
in four areas: taxation, military establishment, regulation of foreign commerce, and 
treaty enforcement. 
Id. at 74-75 (citations omitted). Koh continues: 
Thus, the linchpin of the entire constitutional scheme remained the notion that powers 
in foreign affairs should be distributed among the branches and exercised through 
balanced institutional participation. As Professor Arthur Bestor notes, "the documents 
of this formative period of American constitutionalism consistently treated the conduct 
of foreign relations as a shared responsibility." 
Id. at 76 (quoting Arthur Bestor, &spective Roles of Senate and President in the Making and 
Abrogation of Treaties-the Original Intent of the Framers of the Constitution Historically Examined, 
55 WASH. L.R. 1,72 (1979)) (emphasis supplied by Koh). 
In fact, at least in the early part of American history this sharing of the foreign affairs power 
was the rule and not the exception. 
[T] he crucial point is that even during America's infancy, the time of its greatest national 
insecurity, foreign affairs were not treated as exempt from the ordinary constitutional 
system of checks and balances. To the contrary, the Framers designed the checks and 
balances scheme to apply principally in the realm of foreign affairs. 
Id. at 83 (emphasis in original). Koh concludes that: 
The changing role of government brought about by the New Deal also witnessed a 
redefinition of the constitutional politics of U.S. foreign policy, culminating in the 
Supreme Court's decision in United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304 
(1936). In his majority opinion, Justice Sutherland creates a chasm-which to a large 
extent still exists today-between domestic and international affairs. Quoting (but 
misinterpreting) John Marshall's 1800 speech in the House of Representatives, Suther-
land states that the "extraconstitutional" powers inherent in the foreign affairs powers 
vested entirely in the President. 
Not only ... is the federal power over external affairs in origin and essential character 
different from that over internal affairs, but participation in the exercise of power is 
significantly limited. In this vast external realm with its important, complicated, delicate 
and manifold problems, the President alone has the power to speak or listen as a 
representative of the nation .... 
Id. at 319-20. 
34 The most notable example in recent history where the judiciary has asserted itself in matters 
of foreign affairs was in Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer (Steel Seizure case), 343 U.S. 
579 (1952). Set against the backdrop of the Korean War, President Truman had ordered his 
Secretary of Commerce to seize the nation's striking steel mills, citing his inherent powers as 
president and commander in chief. Id. at 582. The Court, however, invalidated the seizure, 
holding that the President had unconstitutionally usurped legislative authority. Id. at 587-88. 
35 See generally KOH, supra note 33; THOMAS M. FRANCK, POLITICAL QUESTIONS, JUDICIAL 
ANSWERS: DOES THE RULE OF LAw APPLY TO FOREIGN AFFAIRS? (1992). 
310 BOSTON COLLEGE INTERNATIONAL & COMPARATIVE LAw REVIEW [Vol. XIX, No.2 
torial application), while the political branches have served as little 
more than an occasional check on the courts,36 although this has 
started to change, particularly in the area of criminal law. 37 The extra-
territorial journey of the Sherman Antitrust Act is both typical and 
instructive.38 In drafting the legislation, there was no apparent Con-
gressional intent with regard to extraterritoriality. In fact, it is fair to 
say that the members of Congress who passed this legislation had never 
given this question a passing thought. The Supreme Court first gave 
the statute a territorial interpretation in American Banana, only to 
eventually give the unamended statute a much broader reading when 
economic forces began to change.39 Perhaps we could read something 
into the acquiescence(s) of Congress, but its continued silence on the 
extraterritorial question-even in the face of such varying judicial 
interpretations-does not inspire much confidence that the courts are 
actually reflecting Congressional will, if there really is any will to in-
terpret. 
What needs to happen in the extraterritorial context, quite simply, 
is that our various institutions of government should begin to perform 
the same functions that they do in the domestic sphere. For the 
political branches, this means taking on the lion's share in determining 
when, and explaining why, U.S. law should or should not be applied 
extraterritorially. This is the mandate of Aramco.4°Thejudiciary, on the 
other hand, needs to remove itself from determining or promulgating 
36 One of the few times when the Congress has seemed to overturn the judiciary's interpretation 
regarding extraterritoriality has been in the antidiscrimination area. Congress amended the Age 
Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-34 (1988) (see 29 U.S.C. § 623(f) (1) (1988) 
for the 1984 extraterritorial amendments), following several decisions that had given the ADEA 
a territorial reading. DeYoseo v. Bell Helicopter Textron, Inc., 785 F.2d 1282 (5th Cir. 1986); 
Pfeiffer v. Wm. Wrigley Jr. Co., 755 F.2d 554 (7th Cir. 1985); Cleary v. United States Lines, 728 
F.2d 607 (3d Cir. 1984). 
Likewise, almost immediately following the Supreme Court's decision in Aramco, Congress 
passed the Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-66, 105 Stat. 1071 (1991) (codified as 
amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.). Title I contains the heading "Protection of Extra-
territorial Employment," and subsection 109(a) redefines the term "employee" to include any 
U.S. citizen. [d. § 109, 105 Stat. at 1077. Subsection (c) (1) states that if an employer controls a 
corporation incorporated in a foreign country, "any practice prohibited ... shall be presumed 
to be engaged in by such employer." [d. § 109 (c)(I), 105 Stat. at 1077 (codified at 42 U.S.C. 
§ 2000e-n (Supp. III 1991». This section clearly overturns Aramco. See Linda Maher, Drawing 
Circles in the Sand: Extraterritoriality in Civil Rights Litigation After Aramco and the Civil Rights 
Act of 1991,9 CONN.]. INT'L L. 1,28-29 (1993). 
37 See generally Lowenfeld, supra note 2. 
38 See supra notes 3-4 and accompanying text. 
39 See supra note 4 and accompanying text. 
40 EEOC v. Arabian American Oil Co. (Aramco), 499 U.S. 244 (1991). 
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extraterritoriality. Yet, the judiciary must also avoid the toothless role 
that courts have readily assumed in the international realmY Instead, 
it is essential that U.S. courts take on the same kind of role in the 
extraterritorial context that they play domestically.42 That is, U.S. courts 
must serve as a check on the extraterritorial actions of the political 
branches.43 In particular, the judiciary must ensure that even when 
American law is applied beyond the nation's borders, that it comports 
with domestic constitutional standards.44 What makes this particularly 
pressing is the fact that extraterritoriality, by its very nature, goes 
deeply against the grain of democratic governance because those living 
in the country enacting laws that will be enforced in other countries 
will not be accountable to the "other people" in those countries.45 
What role, in particular, should the judiciary play? The closest anal-
ogy is the special protection offered by the judiciary in the Equal 
Protection area. Going back at least to the time of Justice Stone's 
41 See Sanchez-Espinoza v. Reagan, 770 F.2d 202 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (dismissing a suit brought by 
a group of Nicaraguan civilians against the United States government for the policy of supporting 
the contra rebel forces on the basis of sovereign immunity); Committee of U.S. Citizens Living 
in Nicaragua v. Reagan, 859 F.2d 929 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (dismissing a suit against the U.S. govern-
ment for supporting contra rebel forces who were in turn targeting U.S. citizens, the court 
holding that such support did not amount to a Fifth Amendment Due Process violation). 
42 As the Supreme Court held in Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962): 
There are sweeping statements to the effect that all questions touching foreign relations 
are political questions. Not only does resolution of such issues frequently turn on 
standards that dety judicial application, or involve the exercise of a discretion demon-
strably committed to the executive or legislature; but many such questions uniquely 
demand single-voiced statement of the Government's views. Yet it is error to suppose 
that every case or controversy which touches foreign relations lies beyond judicial 
cognizance. 
Id. at 211 (footnotes omitted). 
43 "Blanket deference to executive or congressional actions will signal to the political branches, 
the public, and future courts that the political branches are subject to no legal restrictions." Jules 
Lobel, The Limits of Constitutional Power: Conflicts Between Foreign Policy and International Law, 
71 VA. L. REv. 1071, 1157 (1985). 
44 See generally Jules Lobel, The Constitution Abroad, 83 AM. J. INT'L L. 871 (1989); United States 
v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259 (1990) (Brennan J., dissenting); Mark Gibney, Courts as 
"Teachers in a Vital National Seminar", in WORLD JUSTICE? U.S. COURTS AND INTERNATIONAL 
HUMAN RIGHTS (M. Gibney ed., 1991). 
45 Ely writes: 
The whole point of the approach is to identity those groups in society to whose needs 
and wishes elected officials have no apparent interest in attending. If the approach 
makes sense, it would not make sense to assign its enforcement to anyone but the courts. 
ELY, supra note 32, at 151. 
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famous footnote 4 in Carolene Products,46 courts have used political 
powerlessness, among other criteria, as a reason to hold the political 
branches to the very highest standards, and to provide the highest level 
of judicial scrutiny.47 Non-resident aliens who are bound by the provi-
sions of certain U.S. law represent the ultimate in political powerless-
ness.48 Not only are such people ineligible to vote in U.S. elections and 
46 United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144 (1938). Footnote 4 states: 
There may be narrower scope for operation of the presumption of constitutionality 
when legislation appears on its face to be within a specific prohibition of the Constitu-
tion, such as those of the first ten Amendments, which are deemed equally specific when 
held to be embraced within the Fourteenth Amendment. 
It is unnecessary to consider now whether legislation which restricts those political 
processes, which can ordinarily be expected to bring about scrutiny under the general 
prohibitions of the Fourteenth Amendment than are most other types oflegislation. On 
restrictions upon the right to vote; on restraints upon the dissemination of information; 
on interferences with political organizations; as to prohibition of peaceable assembly. 
Nor need we enquire whether similar considerations enter into the review of statutes 
directed at particular religious, or national, or racial minorities, discrete and insular 
minorities may be a special condition, which tends seriously to curtail the operation of 
those political processes ordinarily to be relied upon to protect minorities, and which 
may call for a correspondingly more searching judicial review. 
Id. at 153 n.4 (citations omitted). 
47 The first case to explicitly use the language of "strict scrutiny" was Korematsu v. United States, 
323 U.S. 214 (1944). Justice Black laid out the governing standard early in his majority opinion: 
"[AlII legal restrictions which curtail the civil rights of a single racial group are immediately 
suspect." Id. at 216. 
The modern day test is that the Court will apply its strictest scrutiny (i.e., the state must have 
a "compelling interest," and it must have chosen the very best means possible to achieve those 
objectives) when either a "fundamental right" is infringed, or there is differential treatment of a 
so-called "suspect class." Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973) (writing for a plurality, 
Justice Brennan concluded that classifications based upon sex are inherently suspect and must 
be subjected to close judicial scrutiny); Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971) (holding that 
aliens as a class are a prime example of a "discrete and insular" minority). But see Mathews v. 
Diaz, 426 U.S. 67 (1976) (upholding a federal statute restricting aliens' access to Medicare unless 
they had been permanent resident aliens for five years); Foley v. Connelie, 435 U.S. 291 (1978) 
(upholding a state statute that restricted the hiring of state troopers to U.S. citizens on the basis 
of the political function served). 
48 In Ely's view, resident aliens represent the prototype of political powerlessness, thereby war-
ranting special judicial protection. 
Aliens cannot vote in any state, which means that any representation they receive will 
be exclusively "virtual." That fact should at the very least require an unusually strong 
showing of a favorable environment for empathy, something that is lacking here. Hos-
tility toward "foreigners" is a time-honored American tradition. Moreover, our legisla-
tures are composed almost entirely of citizens who have always been such. Neither, 
finally, is the exaggerated stereotyping to which that situation lends itself ameliorated 
by any degree of social intercourse between recent immigrants and those who make the 
laws. 
ELY, supra note 32, at 161. 
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thus able to throw the "rascals" out of office, but because they are not 
physically present in this country they have few, if any, opportunities 
to change objectionable U.S. laws. It is readily conceded that even 
filing a lawsuit in the United States to challenge some provision of a 
U.S. law that is being applied extraterritorially might prove to be an 
insurmountable obstacle for an alien living in another country, both 
logistically and jurisdictionally. But perhaps this simply goes to under-
score the very tenuous relationship that exists between extraterritori-
ality, on the one hand, and the notion of democratic rule on the other. 
Unfortunately, the law seems to be heading in the opposite direc-
tion. While the American judiciary has apparently lost a good deal of 
hesitancy in applying U.S. law extraterritorially, it has continued to give 
a territorial reading to the Constitution.49 The leading case in this area 
is Verdugo-UrquideZS° in which the Supreme Court held that the Fourth 
Amendment did not apply to a search conducted by U.S. Drug En-
forcement Agents of a foreign national's home in Mexico. The premise 
of the Court's decision rested on the idea that the Fourth Amendment 
only applies to "the people" of the United States. In his majority 
opinion, Chief Justice Rehnquist writes: 
49 More than a century ago, in a manner consistent with the territorial restriction of American 
law that existed at that time, the United States Supreme Court declared that the "Constitution 
can have no operation in another country." In re Ross, 140 U.S. 453, 464 (1891). However, in 
Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. I (1957), the Court held that a U.S. citizen was afforded constitutional 
protection if harmed abroad by U.S. government action. More recently in Verdugo-Urquidez v. 
United States, 494 U.S. 259 (1990), Chief Justice Rehnquist's majority opinion intimated that 
Fourth Amendment protections would apply to a search in a foreign country by U.S. law 
enforcement officials if the property being searched was the domicile of an American citizen. Id. 
at 259-60. 
In the area of immigration law, a rather sharp dichotomy has been perpetuated between those 
who have made an "entry" into the United States, and those who have not. To remove someone 
who had made an "entry" into the United States, legal or otherwise, a deportation hearing is 
mandated, and the process is given constitutional protection. Yamataya v. Fisher (The Japanese 
Immigrant Case), 189 U.S. 86 (1903). For those who have not made an "entry" (or are attempting 
to make a "re-entry"), removal can be effectuated through an exclusionary hearing, not a 
deportation hearing, and the United States Constitution does not apply. United States ex rei. 
Knauffv. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537, 544 (1950) ("Whatever the procedure authorized by Con-
gress, it is due process as far as an alien denied entry is concerned"); Shaughnessy v. United States 
ex rei. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206 (1953). Knauffand Mezei remain good law, although their harsh 
principles were modified somewhat in Landon v. Plasencia, 459 U.S. 21 (1982). In Landon, a 
returning resident alien who was arrested at the border attempting to smuggle undocumented 
aliens into the United States claimed that she should be given a deportation hearing rather than 
an exclusion hearing. The Court disagreed, but held that because of her previous residence in 
this country, she was entitled to some constitutional protections. Id. at 36-37. 
50 United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259 (1990). 
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[T]he purpose of the Fourth Amendment was to protect the 
people of the United States against arbitrary actions by their 
own Government; it was never suggested that the provision 
was intended to restrain the actions of the Federal Govern-
ment against aliens outside of the United States territory. 51 
Who, exactly, are "the people?" The Court held that constitutional 
protections are not limited to American citizens. Rather, aliens might 
also be offered protection, but only after "they have come within the 
territory of the United States and developed substantial connections 
with this country."52 The Court then went on to hold that because 
Verdugo-Urquidez had only been present in the United States for a 
few days (after he had been arrested and brought to the United States) 
the defendant had not developed the requisite "substantial connec-
tions" for Fourth Amendment purposes. 
The failing of Verdugo-Urquidez, from a philosophical point of view 
and perhaps from a legal perspective as well, is that it maintains 
mutually inconsistent principles. On the one hand, the Court does not 
even question the enforceability of U.S. law by United States agents in 
another country. In fact, the Court didn't even discuss this point in the 
opinion. The Court, however, somehow refuses to extend constitu-
tional protection along with this enforcement.53 In essence, the holding 
is premised on nothing more than the ability-nonexistent in our 
domestic sphere-of being able to have one's cake (enforcement) and 
still have the means to eat it too (non-protection by the law) .54 
51 ld. at 266. 
521d. at 271. 
53 Another situation with enforcement of U.s. law without any corresponding protection arose 
in Sale v. Haitian Centers Council, 113 S. Ct. 2549 (1993). In Sale, the Court held that the 
nonrefoulement provisions of the Immigration and Nationality Act did not apply beyond the 
territorial boundaries of the United States. However, as Harold Koh has pointed out, the Court 
did not even consider the issue of whether United States law could be enforced on the high seas. 
The Court took that as a given. KOH, supra note 33, at 319-20. 
54 How far can the holding in Verdugo-Urquidez extend? The caselaw regarding abductions in 
foreign countries would seem to indicate that there are some limitations, but the point where 
they arise is fairly remarkable. The leading case on this matter is Ker v. Illinois, 119 U.S. 436 
(1886). In Ker, government officials in Illinois sought to prosecute Ker, a U.S. citizen living in 
Peru, on charges of larceny and embezzlement. ld. at 437. At the behest of the Governor of 
Illinois, the President of the United States directed that federal agents be sent to Peru to request 
Ker's extradition. ld. at 438. The agent never made the extradition request, however, and forcibly 
abducted Ker instead and brought him to the United States. Ker challenged the court's jurisdic-
tion over him on the basis of the kidnapping, but the Supreme Court held that the manner in 
which Ker was brought into court was immaterial. ld. at 443-44. The holding of Kerwas implicitly 
reaffirmed in United States v. Humberto Alvarez-Machain, 504 U.S. 655 (1992), where the 
Supreme Court held that notwithstanding the extradition agreement between the United States 
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What must be restored in the extraterritorial context is some sem-
blance of constitutional balance; one where the political branches are 
responsible for creating the law, but the courts serve as a check against 
governmental abuses. At present, the extraterritorial application of 
U.S. law does not come close to resembling lawmaking in the domestic 
sphere. In addition to rectifying these institutional transgressions, what 
also is needed is the establishment of normative principles to guide 
the extraterritorial application of domestic law. 
III. THE IMPERATIVE OF ESTABLISHING NORMATIVE PRINCIPLES 
Although it is readily accepted that the United States has the power 
to apply its laws extraterritorially, this article has attempted to show 
that such a proposition is far more problematic than it has generally 
been treated. Not only is extraterritoriality an anathema to our most 
deeply held views regarding representative democracy,55 but it has also 
prompted our institutions of government to play decidedly different, 
and inferior, roles than they do in the domestic context. 
The essential problem is that extraterritoriality is both "underinclu-
sive" and "overinclusive" (and, in some instances, both at the same 
time), and because of this it is without any coherent guiding principles. 
We have already discussed several forms of underinclusiveness. One is 
the very selective and inconsistent manner in which U.S. law has been 
applied extraterritorially. As we have seen, some areas of law have been 
readily applied overseas, while other laws, with jurisdictional language 
that is every bit as vague and uncertain, have been given a territorial 
reading. Another form of underinclusiveness that we have touched 
upon is the inconsistent result of applying and enforcing U.S. law 
beyond the country's boundaries, but then giving the Constitution a 
territorial reading, at least with respect to non-citizens.56 
and Mexico, an American court would still have jurisdiction over a person where United States 
Drug Enforcement Agents bypassed the treaty's provisions and simply kidnapped the defendant. 
The Second Circuit is the only court that has refused to permit prosecution on the basis of a 
forced abduction. United States v. Toscanino, 500 F.2d 267 (2d Cir. 1974). In Toscanino, the 
defendant was repeatedly tortured over a 17 day period. Id. at 269. Although foreign agents were 
responsible for carrying out these actions, U.S. law enforcement agents were kept fully apprised 
of the proceedings. Toscanino was subsequently limited by another Second Circuit case, United 
States ex rel. Lujan v. Gengler, 510 F.2d 62 (2d Cir. 1975), where the court held that in order to 
divest itself of jurisdiction, the conduct of U.S. agents must be "of the most outrageous and 
reprehensible kind" which results in the denial of due process. Id. at 65. 
55 The rallying cry of the American Revolutionary war was "no taxation without representation." 
Yet, the extraterritorial application of U.S. law is essentially "legislation without representation." 
56 Lobel notes that: 
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Another kind of underinclusiveness-in this case because of the 
unequal treatment of similarly situated individuals-has arisen regard-
ing the manner in which U.S. law has been applied extraterritorially. 
One such example is the extraterritorial application of U.S. antidis-
crimination legislation. Responding to territorial interpretations of the 
Age Discrimination in Employment Act,57 and the Civil Rights Act,58 
Congress quickly amended both statutes to specifically give them an 
extraterritorial reading.59 The ultimate result of this congressional ac-
tion, however, is puzzling at best and inconsistent at worst. At present, 
U.S. multinational corporations operating in other countries are pro-
hibited by U.S. law from discriminating on the basis of age, race, color, 
religion, sex, or national origin-but only as long as the discriminatory 
behavior is aimed at a U.S. citizen. That also is to say that there is 
nothing (at least under U.S. law) that would prevent these same U.S. 
corporations (or the United States government itself) from systemati-
cally discriminating against foreign nationals, or even permanent resi-
dent aliens of the United States for that matter, in their operations in 
other countries. 
Finally, underinclusiveness is also manifested by the manner in 
which "effects" are factored in. That is, while the United States has 
been very quick to regulate a myriad of phenomena in the world that 
have, or are perceived as having, a negative effect on U.S. interests, the 
United States has tended to ignore those situations where its govern-
ment or corporate entities have had a negative effect on others. The 
environmental damage caused by Texaco in its operations in Ecuador 
is a prime example of this problem.60 There certainly are "effects" from 
[IJmposing constitutional standards whenever the Government acts reflects an under-
standing of our common humanity in an increasingly interdependent world. Instead of 
viewing ourselves as living apart from the world and reserving to ourselves our consti-
tutional protections, we should recognize that the interdependence of individuals, 
societies and nations requires acceptance of "human rights" as inhering in all individu-
als. 
Lobel, supra note 44, at 87. 
57 See supra note 36 and accompanying text. 
58Id. 
59Id. 
60 Jennifer K. Rankin, U.S. Laws in the IWinforest: Can a U.S. Court Find Liability for Extrater-
ritorial Pollution fry a U.S. Corporation? An Analysis of Aguinda v. Texaco, Inc., 18 B.C. INT'L & 
COMPo L. REv. 221 (1995). As Rankin points out, although the Ecuadoran Constitution guarantees 
a clean environment, class action suits are not allowed and there is no meaningful discovery in 
Ecuadoran courts. Thus, unless U.S. courts-and U.S. laws-apply, there might be no effective 
remedy for the environmental carnage that has been brought about by a U.S. corporation. Id. at 
222. 
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Texaco's operations; however, under the current reading of the law, all 
such effects are simply in Ecuador, not the United States. Apparently 
because of this, and notwithstanding the fact that it is an American 
corporation that is causing this damage, U.S. law does not apply. What 
furthers the problem-at least from the perspective of the citizens of 
Ecuador-is that given the primitive nature of the Ecuadoran legal 
system, there is little likelihood that any action will ever be taken 
against Texaco.61 
In addition to being underinclusive, the extraterritorial application 
of U.S. law is at times overinclusive as well. For example, certain U.S. 
laws, such as antiterrorist measures and drug enforcement laws, apply 
(in theory, and perhaps in fact) against the entire world population. 
Very few countries, however, have the ability to apply and enforce their 
laws against U.S. nationals, at least while these individuals are physically 
present in the United States. 
Finally, there are also ways in which the extraterritorial application 
of U.S. law has been both underinclusive and overinclusive at the same 
time. The reason for this is that extraterritoriality has been applied as 
an either/or proposition. That is, either U.S. law is applied extraterri-
torially, in which case it applies to every country in the world, notwith-
standing the domestic law in particular countries, or else it is not 
applied extraterritorially, in which case it only applies in the United 
States. The problem with this, however, is the degree to which coun-
tries differ rather dramatically in terms of the legal protections that 
they offer. 
Consider the sale of nuclear reactors to other countries.62 Some 
receiving countries-the Philippines for example-have had scant ex-
perience in this field, possess little or no meaningful regulatory appa-
ratus, and have shown extraordinarily poor judgment in terms of their 
track record with regard to nuclear power.63 On the other hand, other 
countries-such as France-have one of the most highly developed 
regulatory schemes in the world. The point is that the sale of nuclear 
reactors to these two countries is nowhere close to being the same. 
What I am also suggesting is that the territorial restriction of U.S. 
61 Id. Of course, the Texaco example is by no means the first case of this. For a discussion of 
another tragedy, the Union Carbide disaster in Bhopal, India, and the perpetuation by multina-
tional corporations of two sets of standards--domestic versus international-see Ratna Kapur, 
From Human Tragedy to Human Rights: Multinational Carporate Accountability for Human Rights 
Violations, 10 B.C. THIRD WORLD LJ. 1 (1990). 
62 See supra note 8 and accompanying text. 
63Id. 
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nuclear regulatory law is underinclusive with respect to the sale of a 
nuclear reactor to the Philippines because of the severe shortcomings 
in that country's regulatory scheme combined with the enormous level 
of devastation that a nuclear power accident could bring about. Con-
versely, applying U.S. nuclear regulations to France is probably overin-
clusive, for just the opposite reason. 
It is essential to address these problems of over and underinclusive-
ness, but particularly the latter. The Restatement (Third) of the Law 
of Foreign Relations provides some advance in this area by positing a 
number of factors to be considered in determining the appropriate-
ness of extending domestic law to other countries. 54 The purpose of 
64 Section 402, Bases of Jurisdiction: 
Subject to § 403, a state has jurisdiction to prescribe law with respect to 
(1) (a) conduct that, wholly or in substantial part, takes place within its territory; 
(b) the status of persons, or interests in things, present within its territory; 
(c) conduct outside its territory that has or is intended to have substantial effect within 
its territory; 
(2) the activities, interests, status, or relations of its nationals outside as well as within 
its territory; and 
(3) certain conduct outside its territory by persons not its nationals that is directed 
against the security of the state or against a limited class of other state interests. 
Section 403, Limitations on Jurisdiction to Prescribe: 
(1) Even when one of the bases for jurisdiction under § 402 is present, a state may not 
exercise jurisdiction to prescribe law with respect to a person or activity having connec-
tions with another state when the exercise of having such jurisdiction is unreasonable. 
(2) Whether exercise of jurisdiction over a person or activity is unreasonable is deter-
mined by evaluating all relevant factors, including, where appropriate: 
(a) the link of the activity to the territory of the regulating state, i.e., the extent to which 
the activity takes place within the territory, or has substantial, direct, and foreseeable 
effect upon or in the territory; 
(b) the connections, such as nationality, residence, or economic activity, between the 
regulating state and the person principally responsible for the activity to be regulated, 
or between that state and those to whom the regulation is designed to protect; 
(c) the character of the activity to be regulated, the importance of the regulation to the 
regulating state, the extent to which other states regulate such activities, and the degree 
to which the desirability of such regulation is generally accepted; 
(d) the existence of justified expectations that might be protected or hurt by the 
regulation; 
(e) the importance of the regulation to the international political, legal or economic 
system; 
(f) the extent to which the regulation is consistent with the traditions of the interna-
tional system; 
(g) the extent to which another state may have an interest in regulating the activity; and 
(h) the likelihood of conflict with regulation by another state. 
(3) When it would not be unreasonable for each of two states to exercise jurisdiction 
over a person or activity, but the prescriptions by the two states are in conflict, each state 
has an obligation to evaluate its own as well as the other state's interest in exercising 
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section 403 is to limit the extraterritorial application of U.S. law to 
those instances where it would be "reasonable" to do SO.55 In fact, U.S. 
law has been applied extraterritorially in a variety of ways where there 
is some "reasonable" effect within the United States. The real problem, 
however, is not overinclusiveness as much as it is underinclusiveness. 
What the Restatement also needs to address is "reasonableness" from 
the other side, namely, instances where it would be "unreasonable" not 
to apply the elements or the protections of U.S. law. 
Consider, for example, that while there is a ban on the domestic sale 
and use of pesticides such as DBCP, no American law prohibits the sale 
or use of these same poisons outside the United States.55 Because of 
these differing standards, a chemical that is known to be dangerous 
(and is banned in the United States) continues to be manufactured in 
the United States and sold overseas, oftentimes by U.S. multinational 
corporations.57 This dichotomy is decidedly wrong, and it is not "rea-
sonable" that U.S. law only seeks to protect those living within this 
country's territorial borders. 
This is not meant to suggest that all U.S. law should be applied 
extraterritorially, or should be presumed to be.58 In fact, given the lack 
of extraterritorial reciprocity, one might well make the argument that 
too much American law is enforced overseas. What is needed, however, 
is some attempt at balance, so that the United States does not continue 
to perpetuate a system whereby the enforcement provisions of its laws 
are readily applied extraterritorially, but without any of the protections 
of these same laws. 
jurisdiction, in light of all the relevant factors. Subsection (2); a state should defer to 
the other state if that state's interest is clearly greater. 
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS, §§ 402, 403 (1986). 
65Id. 
66 In 1977 the chemical, dibromochloropropane, or DBCP, was found to cause sterility in men 
working at an Occidental Petroleum plant in Lathrop, California, prompting an immediate ban 
on its use in California, and sharply restricting its use elsewhere in the continental United States 
(a total ban was enacted in 1979). For several years thereafter, however, several U.S. manufacturers 
of the chemical continued to sell it in their overseas operations, and a number of U.S. food 
growers continued to spray their crops in a number of Third World countries with the substance. 
A lawsuit has recently been filed in the United States on behalf of 20,000 foreign workers claiming 
that the pesticide caused sterility, cancer and birth defects. See DianaJean Schemo, U.S. Pesticide 
Kills Foreig;n Fruit Pickers' Hopes, N.Y TIMES, Dec. 6, 1995, at AS. 
67 For an extended discussion of this issue see Henry Shue, Exporting Hazards, 91 ETHICS 579 
(1981). 
68 Born, supra note 4 (courts should apply a rebuttable presumption that Congress intended 
federal statutes to extend extraterritorially when contemporary principles of private international 
law would so allow). 
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The two most important considerations in determining the degree 
to which the protections of U.S. law ought to be applied extraterrito-
riallyare: (1) the degree of harm that might ensue; and (2) the degree 
to which other countries are able or willing to prevent this harm from 
taking place. If serious harm to people, the environment, or to wildlife 
is likely to occur, and if it appears that the receiving country will do 
little or nothing about this, then the United States has a moral obliga-
tion, which should form the basis for a legal obligation, to prevent this 
serious harm from occurring.69 
The easy response, of course, is to say that it is the responsibility of 
these other countries to protect their own workers, or it is the respon-
sibility of the multinational corporations who are doing business in this 
country; it is not the responsibility of the United States government. 
This is a fair criticism. However, when there are indications that these 
other countries, or the corporate entities themselves, are not taking 
protective measures, then there is a duty on the U.S. government (as 
well as the governments of other countries whose corporations are 
doing business in a similar fashion) to apply extraterritorially the same 
or similar protective measures that exist within our domestic sphere. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Although there has been a veritable explosion in the extraterritorial 
application and enforcement of U.S. law,7° there has been scant reflec-
tion for how this phenomenon fits into our governmental scheme. The 
reason for this is that there are few domestic consequences from the 
extraterritorial application of U.S. law. Instead, these consequences-
both positive and negative-are much more apparent in those other 
countries where American law is being applied. Extraterritoriality is an 
anathema to the United States democratic system because those who 
make and enforce the law (us) are not accountable to those individuals 
in other countries who are bound by it (individuals in other countries). 
69 Perhaps the leading work in the area of transnational duties is Henry Shue's book BASIC 
RIGHTS: SUBSISTENCE, AFFLUENCE, AND U.S. FOREIGN POLICY (1980). Shue argues that there are 
three duties that we all have: (1) the duty to avoid depriving others; (2) the duty to protect others 
from deprivation; and (3) the duty to aid those who have been deprived. Id. at 52. 
An excellent example of a situation where there would be a duty to act would be to halt the 
atrocious working conditions that many foreign toy manufacturers in the Third World-making 
toys for children in the industrialized world-have their employees work under. Michael Pangeli-
nan, Lost Lives to the Overseas Toy Industry: A Callfor Action, 16 Loy. L.A. INT'L & COMPo LJ. 735 
(1994). 
70 See generally Nadelmann, supra note 25. 
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It has been argued that, because of this, special protective measures 
ought to be taken to ensure some form of representation for those who 
are bound by U.S. law, but who are essen tially voiceless in the American 
political system. 
To address these concerns two things must change. First, our insti-
tutions of government must begin to perform the same role in the 
extraterritorial context that they do domestically. What is particularly 
important is that the judiciary play the same kind of protective role 
that it has played domestically in ensuring some form of representation 
for the politically powerless. Secondly, the development of normative 
principles that would guide the extraterritorial application of U.S. law 
is crucial. In establishing these principles the United States should 
begin by recognizing some of the realities of extraterritoriality: that 
extraterritoriality is seldom reciprocal, but rather is based on positions 
of relative power; that the protections offered by American law and the 
American Constitution have certainly not followed the extraterritorial 
application and enforcement of U.S. law; and finally, that the very 
selective extraterritorial application of U.S. law has essentially served 
the interests of the United States government and its corporate enti-
ties, but not necessarily the interests of those now living under the 
commands of U.S. law. 
Rather than living under this kind of legal system (or, more accu-
rately, rather than having others live under it), we need far more 
balance in the extraterritorial application of U.S. laws than we have 
had to date. For one thing, the United States must create a system 
where the protections of U.S. law coincide with the enforcement of 
U.S. law. The United States must also apply its laws extraterritorially to 
ensure that it does not continue to exploit and harm others. Finally, 
the United States must recognize that at the base of any legal system 
in the true sense of the word is some notion of justice and some 
measure of fairness. These qualities are not currently reflected in the 
extraterritorial application of U.S. law. 
